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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
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DEFENDANT's 
AND 
....-\PPELLANT 's 
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FOR 
REHEARING 
Comes no'v the defendant and appellant and peti-
tions the above entitled Court for .a rehearing in the 
above entitled cause upon the following grounds, to-wit: 
1. This Court failed to recognize the distinction 
in the law of nuisances between permanent and tem-
porary damages, and adopted the wrong measure of 
damages. 
2. This Court has ignored the doctrine of D~ahl v. 
Utah Oil Refining C·ompany. 
3. The Court erred in assuming in its opinion that 
the defendant waived a jury trial. 
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1 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT -1\ND APPELLANT IN 
SUPPORT OF l')ETITION FOR REHEARING 
I. 
This Court failed to recognize the distinction in the 
laze of nuisances betzceen perrnanent and temp~orary dam-
ages, and adopted the wrong rneasure of damag,es. 
In its opinion in the principal case this Court said that 
~ • the trial court properly held that the nuisance was a 
recurring rather than a continuing one." Furthermore, 
-'it appears that the trial court based depreciation on 
the frequent recurrence of stench, not on any assump-
tion that the building and other physical structures of 
appellant as located constituted a nuisance." 
Also: ''There can be no doubt about the fact that 
the operation of defendant's plant, by reason of the 
nauseating odors and stenches thereby produced, con-
stituted an intermittent but frequently recurring nuis-
ance \vi thin the 1neaning of our statutes.'' 
And: ''Furthermore, the trial court properly held 
that the nuisance was a recurring rather than a con-
tinuing one, and therefore very properly held that the 
statutes of limitations were inapplicable." 
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2 
Clearly this Court adopted the vie\v that the nuisance 
"\Yas recurrent. 1'" et it adopted the 1neasure of damages 
used by the lower court-the depreciation of market 
value of plaintiffs' property, which is aln1ost universally 
recognized as an unfair measure except for a permanent 
nuisance, and \vhich has not been adopted by this Court 
until this case even for permanent nuisances, except by 
consent of the litigants. The opinion cites 1"'hackery v. 
Union Portland Cement Co., 64 Utah 437, 231 P. 813, and 
Lewis v. Pingree National Bank, 47 Utah 35, 151 P. 558, 
L. R. A. 1916 C. 1260, as the authorities for the use of 
depreciation of 1narket value for a recurrent nuisance 
and for pern1anent uninterrupted nuisances. Neither 
case, however, so holdB. The Lewis case holds that the 
proper measure is the depreciation in the value of the 
use of the premises ; the Thackery case, that the parties 
Inay acquiesce in the use of the n1arket value as a 
measure. 
Lewis ;z:. Pingree N atl. Bank, supra, involved a per-
manent damage caused by the encroach1nent of pillars of 
a bank on the property of the plaintiff and hy the pro-
jection of the pillars and steps of the bank into the side-
vvalk in such a manner a~ to injure the business of the 
plaintiff's je\velry store. 
The court said: 
"When, as here, ho\vever, the court does not 
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6) 
t> 
deem it just and equitable to order the thing 
\\~hich causes the impairment of the value as 
aforesaid to be removed, then the plaintiff must 
in one action recover his dan1ages for all time, 
and the defendant, unless he chooses to re1nove 
the offending structure, n1ust pay all the damages 
suffered by the plaintiff both past and prospec-
tiYe. lT nder such circ1nnstances the measure of 
da1nages, as stated by ~Jr. Sutherland, is, 'How 
n1uch the value of the plaintiff's use of the prem-
ises affected has been lessened by the defendant's 
\\~rongdoing ~ J? ,,~ e thus see that in cases like the 
one at bar plaintiff's property is not directly 
affected or depreciated by physical injury, but 
the Yalue of its use for business purposes only is 
affected~ and n1ay to some extent be depreciated. 
If it were thus sho,vn that the obstruction lessened 
or reduced the rental value of plaintiff's store-
rooin, it \vould depreciate the value of the use of 
such roo1n. The plaintiff is entitled, therefore, 
to recover in one action the full depreciation of 
the value of his property as just stated. To illus-
trate: Assuming that the pillars complained of 
reduced or lessened the rent of plaintiff's store 
to the extent of $33.33 per month, then his prop-
erty would be damaged in a su1n which, if invested 
at the legal rate of interest, \vould produce that 
amount. 'Vhat is that sum~ Under our legal 
rate of interest, it would be $5,000, since $5,000, 
invested at 8 per cent. interest, would yield $400 
a year, or an equivalent of $33.33 per month. If 
the rent of plaintiff's store, therefore, is reduced 
to the amount of $33.33 per month, he should be 
awarded $5,000, and no more. The foregoing 
illustration is offered 1nerely as a guide in deter-
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4 
mining the measure of damages, where, as here, 
the whole damages must be recovered in one ac-
tion, and in doing so we do not intimate that the 
plai.ntiff suffered that or any other sum or amount 
of damages. The foregoing n1easure of damages 
is also approved in Joyce, I.Jaw of Nuisances, sec-
tion 259, and in 3 Joyce on Dan1ages, section 
2150. '' 
In the Thackery case the parties had stipulated and 
agreed upon the n1easure of damages. The court said: 
''The only error argued by appellant is the 
ruling of the court in holding that the cause of 
action is not barred by the statute of limitations. 
At the oral argument counsel for the appellant 
stated that, if this court is of the opinion that 
the action is not barred by the statute of lin1ita-
tions, he did not ask a reversal of the judg1nent. '' 
Directly on the point of damages the court further 
said: 
"It is suggested in the argun1ent that, the 
injury being a recurring invasion of respondent's 
rights, the court could not per1nit recovery of full 
co1npensation in one action as for a pern1anent 
injury. In other words, that the respondent's 
causes of action \Vere founded upon a recurring 
nuisance, and that, the nuisance being in its nature 
abatable either by act of the parties or by judicial 
decree, the only power the court had was to per1ni t 
recovery of such damages as had been sustained 
within the period of liinitation prior to the in~titn-
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~) 
tion or trial of the action. The court in this case 
is dealing \vith private parties. The appellant is 
neither a public nor a quasi public corporation. 
Ho\vever necessary or beneficial the products 
manufactured by appellant may be for the com-
Inunity in constructing public roads and in general 
building operations, nevertheless it is distinctly a 
private enterprise. No g~ood reason appea.rs, 
therefore, zDhy, if the parties so elect ~either by 
agreenzent or by acqniescence, the c-ourt should not 
pernzit a recocery ·of co1npBnsation as for a per-
Jnanent injury in one acti~on. Such would neces-
sarily tend to lessen litigation and once and for 
all detern1ine the respective rights of the parties. 
~r any of the states, as I understand the decisions, 
pern1it that to be done. That right was recognized 
by this court in Kinsman v. Gas Co., 53 Utah, 10, 
177 P. 418." (Italics .ours.) 
In the case at bar there has been no acquiescence 
and no agreement that this measure could be used in this 
c-ase. Objections vvere raised at all proceedings to the 
irrelevance, incompetency, and immateriality of ques-
tions based on this n1easure. (Trans. 1127, Abs. 288 ; 
Trans. 1129, _._~bs. 290; Trans. 1209, Abs. 308; Trans. 
1214, Abs. 310 ~ Trans. 1234, Abs. 321; Trans. 1235, Abs. 
322 ; Trans. 1250, Abs. :325; Trans. 1251, Abs. 326.) The 
evidence, of course, is uncontradicted to the effect that the 
odors are recurring and intermittent and do no damage 
\vhatever to the crops or the productivity of the land. 
Under the decision as it is now phrased, the plain-
tiffs \Vill have recovered the full difference bet\veen the 
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value of the land as it would be without the presence of 
the plant and as it i~ with the plant in operation. The 
evidence shows that there are many other neighbors in 
the community and living at distances less than those 
of some of the plaintiffs who have not participated in 
this law suit (Abs. 192, Tr. 830). Any one of these 
neighbors, or anyone succeeding to the interest of any 
of these neighbors who have not participated, can no'v 
come in and possibly under a different sho\ving of facts 
obtain an injunction. 'rhe plant in that event will be 
forced to close do,vn. These plaintiffs' properties 'vill 
then be restored to their original value, but the plaintiffs 
will have nevertheless received these damages con1puted 
upon the permanent existence and operation of the plant. 
Obviously, this is inequitable ~nd alone should be grounds 
for granting a rehearing for further investigation h~· 
this Court into the lavv regarding permanent and tem-
porary n u1sances. 
In 39 American Juris prudence 131, 132 and 1;13 
(pages 391-397), it is said: 
"§ 131. DistinctiDn between Permanent onrl 
Recurrent Injuries : In order to give a 
cause of action for original and per1nanent dan1-
ages, the injury n1ust be constant and continuous, 
not occasional, intermittent, or recurrent.'' . . . 
"§ 132. Abatable Character of Nuisance as· 
T.est: To make the cause of the injury permanent 
in the legal sense of the tern1, there must he, in 
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force or op~ration, a lPgal right to 1naintain it . 
.... \rrnrrling to 1nnny of th(? authorities a nuisance 
is te1nporary or continuing \vhere it is re1nediable, 
renloYable~ or abatable, as \vhere it may be abaterl 
hy the defendant, or b~· legal process at the in-
~tance of the injured party, against the \vill of 
the person creating it. For this reason it has 
been said that the elen1ent of per1nanency of a 
cause of injury is generally lacking in cases of 
public and private nuisances, and that aln1ost 
every pure nuisance is regarded in la\v as being 
continuous. So, it has been held that except in the 
rase of public or quasi-public corporation, a nui-
sance resulting from a business conducted or a 
structure or 'vorks erected and n1aintained by a 
person on his o\vn property is a continuing one, 
as, for exa1nple, a nuisance consisting of smoke, 
ft1111es. or odors .... " 
'• § 135. Depreciation ~in T?a.hte of Property: 
. If the nuisance is of an occasional or tem-
porary character, the 1neasure of damage is the 
difference in the rental or usable value of the 
pre1niscs before and after the injury, or, it has 
been held, \vhere the property is rented, the dif-
ference in its rental value during the term of the 
lease. ~rhe diminution in the value of the fee in 
the land is not a proper test in such case.'' 
In Robb 1i. Carne.qie Bros. & C,o., 145 (Pa.) 324, 22 
.A tl. (j.-t~), plaintiff brought an action to recover damages 
for injuries to his far1n by reason of the smoke and gas 
fr(nn defendant's eoke ovens erected on adjoining lands. 
rfhP }u\\'C~r COUrt granted cla1nages by perinitting testi-
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1nony regarding the productivity of the farm if the s1noke 
\\rere absent. The Supreme Court asked, "What then is 
the measure of damages~' ' and answered the question 
hy saying: 
''If the result is to sho\v a per1nanent injury 
to the soil which impairs its productiveness to an 
appreciable degree, the extent of the loss in the 
value of the farm can be readily computed. If 
such permanent impairment is not made to ap-
pear, this part of plaintiff's claim should be re-
jected altogether. The fact that the plaintiff n1ay 
regard his home as less desirable than before 
because of the proximity of an undesirable busi-
ness or of undesirable neighbors, or the further 
fact that its selling value has been reduced by 
reason of such proximity, affords no ground for a 
recovery. The location of a livery stable, a res-
taurant, a distillery, and n1any other kinds of 
business close to one's ho1ne nlight din1inish its 
co1nfort and its rnarket value, but the owner \Vonld 
he without legal redress, so far as the effpet of 
1nere proxinTity is concerned. 
''If, ho\vever, the business \vas so conducted 
as to affect the use of adjoining property or the 
health of its occupant~.;, these tangihle and sub-
stantial injuries capable of measuren1ent by a 
pecuniary standard n1ight sustain an action for 
da1nages. The ordinary rtttle for the ascertainn1ent 
of damages, where land has been entered and 
appropriated under the right of e1ninent donuti·n, 
does not furnish a rneasure ·Of the plaintiff's r1"ght 
t·o recover in this case, for the reason already 
given. Where an entr~T and seizure has been 1naclc\ 
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the effect of the sPizurr and appropl'iation of part 
of the land. of the O\Yner to a partieular use is to 
be consi(lered, as \veil as the value of vvhat is 
tnken. This can be best ailjusted b~~ ascertaining 
the selling Yalue of the \vhole property before the 
entry, and after it has been made. The difference~ 
if any~ sho\\~s the actual loss which the ovvner has 
suffered. But in this rase there has been no entry 
upon or appropriation of the plaintiff's land. 
\\"'"hat he alleges is that the prosecution of the busi-
ne~s of n1aking coke l1y the defendants on their 
o\vn land has hurt his erops and injured his soil. 
They have the right to n1ake coke. If the estab-
li~hn1ent of that business near the plaintiff affects 
the selling value of his farm, he can no more re-
cov-er for that than he could recover against the 
saloon-keeper or the livery-man because the loca-
tion of their business near him had n1ade his prop-
erty un~alable. The nature of the husiness is 
therefore to he left out of vie\v. The sole question 
is, "That ha1·1n had been done h~T the plaintiff by, 
or as the direct result of, the prosecution of the 
defendant's business at a place where they had a 
legal right to carry it on~ The plaintiff might 
honestly think, and his neighbors might be willing 
to testify, that the mere location of the ovens on 
adjoining land reduced the value of his farm 30 
or 50 per cent, or more, and a comparison by them 
of the value before and after the building of these 
ovens vvould include this element, for vvhich there 
ran he no recovery.'' (Itali'cs ours.) 
The difference het,veen temporary, recurrent dam-
ag-r, like that raused by the fluctuating odors of the Colo-
rado Anilnal plant, and perrnanent physical dan1ages to 
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10 
realty, is shown the case of IJfid-C.antinent Petroleurn 
Corp vs. Fisher, 183 Okla. 638, 84 Pac. (2d) 22. That 
case involved permanent damage. The defendant drilled 
several oil wells and the salt \Vater and oil from these 
\vells polluted a creeh:, and overflo\ving the plaintiff's 
lands, destroyed the fertility of his soil and killed a 
number of pecan trees. The defendant contended that 
the proper measure of damage was the loss of use or 
rental value sustained by the plaintiff to the date of 
filing because the nuisance \Vas abatable, and because a 
ten1porary injurious condition vvill not suppo1·t a judg-
ment for permanent damage to realty. 
The court held that this damage \Vas pern1anent and 
said: 
''The rule of damages stated by the defendant 
is a correct rule vvhen applied to the proper fac-
tual situation and has been follovved by thi~ court 
\vhen the damage suffered was teinporary and ~us­
ceptible of being remedied by the expenditure of 
1noney or labor. City of Cushing v. High, 73 Old. 
151, 175 P. 229; City of Ardmore v. Orr, 35 OkL 
305, 129 P. 867. But in the instant case the plain-
tiff sought to recover con1pensation fo1· perinan-
ent damage to his realty. Either the dainage or 
the cause of the da1nage can be pern1anent, in the 
legal sense, or temporary, but the rule of dan1-
ages applicable in a given case is deterinined by 
\vhether the damage suffered is pern1anent or 
temporar~r rather than vvhether the caus0 of the 
damage is permanent or temporary and su.~cept­
ible of being remedied and abaterl. '' 
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llacine r. C'atllolic Ei.~.,·hop of C'hicn/}o, 290 Ill. App. 
~S-L S X l~. (:?d) 210, involYed foul odor~ fro1n se"\\rage. 
The court ~aid: 
""It has been ~aid, as to nuisances "\vhich may 
be ren1oved at any tiine or abated at the instance 
of a party aggrievPd thereb~r, that the deprecia-
tion in the n1arket of selling value of the premises 
affected "Ta~ not the n1easure of damages, and 
eYidence of such depreciation not proper. Fair-
bauk Co. c. ~-ricolai, 167 Ill. 242, 246, 47 N. E. 
3GO. If the property alleged to be damaged is 
rental propert~T' then in ease of injury from such 
nuisance, the damages "\vould be measured by the 
lo~~ in rental value; and if the plaintiff occupies 
the pre1nise~ himself, the damages would be mea-
sured by his diseo1nfort and the deprivation of 
the use and co1nforts of his ho1ne. In the case 
no"T before us, the plaintiff neither lived upon 
the premises nor used the same for rental pur-
poses. He alleged that a total loss had been sus-
tained hy him 'vith respect to the market value of 
the unsold lots in said subdivision. It has been 
said that the pollution of a stream by se,vage is 
a continuing nuisance, and that, ''vhen a nuisance 
is regarded as a continuing, rather than a per-
ITlanent, one, judgments of law are held to afford 
con1pensation only for the injury sustained to 
the time of such judginent, and a continuance of 
the nuisance is a grievance for ,~vhich subsequent 
actions m.ay· be maintained.' ... 
''After an examination of the record, we fail 
to find "\Vhere appellant's evidence tended to sho'v 
any item of damage 'vhich coul(1 be considered 
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12 
proper under the rules applicable to this action. 
The ·record fails to disclose any evidence tending 
to show what damages appellant claims to have 
sustained or the extent thereof, except his clain1 
that the appellee, by admitting sewage to the 
creek, has destroyed the entire market value of 
the unsold lots in said subdivision, to the da1nage 
of appellant of $105,000. Such vvas not a proper 
elen1ent of damages in this case .... '' 
In C~ity ,of Nashville v. Comer, 88 Tenn. 418, 12 S.\\'". 
1027, an action \vas brought to recover dan1ages resulting 
in the discharge, in times of unusual freshet, of se\vage 
"rater on the pren1ises o\vned by the plaintiffs. The trial 
judge charged the jury that if they found fro1n the 
evidence'' that the 1narket value of the plaintiffs' property 
has been permanently impaired by the construction of the 
se,ver, its proxin1i(v and liability to back up surfae(• 
\Vater, and discharge offensive sewage n1atter upon his 
pren1ises, he \vould be entitled to recover the differener 
in the market value of the propert~T before and since 
the building of the sewer.'' The Supren1e Court held this 
instruction to be error, saying: 
''The moment an action has been con1menre(l, 
shall the defendant, in such a case, be precluded 
from remedying its wrong~ Shall it be so pre-
cluded after a recovery against it~ Does it es-
tablish the right to continue to be a wrong-doer 
. forever by the payment of a recovery against it u? 
Shall it have no benefit by discontinuing the 
wrong~ And shall it not be left the option to 
discontinue it~ 101 N.Y. 125, 4 N.E. T~ep. 552. 
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rr'his ns~tunption that H \\'TOng-doer is to be pre-
~llllled fron1 thP 1nere eharurter of the \Vork to 
intend to continue in his 'vrong, and that he will 
not ren1edy his defective or unskilled \Vork, is 
repudiated in the 1najority of An1erican cases .... 
H 'Che 'veight of authority and the weight of 
rea~on alike conden1n, as contrary to a true pub-
lic policy, any rule by 'vhich a wrong-doer may 
thu~ procure a license to continue his n1isconduct. 
~uch a rule "'"ould in many instances operate as a 
1nethod by \vhich private property 'vould be con-
denlned to private use against the will of the 
O\vner. It see1ns to us that the true rule deduc-
ible fro1n the authorities is that the la'v will not 
presu1ne the continuance of a wrong, nor allo\v 
a license to continue a 'vrong, where the causing 
the injury is of such a nature as to he abatable 
either by the expenditure of labor or n1oney; and 
that. 'vhere the cause of the injury is one not 
presumed to continue, the dam.ages recoverable 
frorn the \Vrong-doer are only such as have ac-
crued before action brought, and that successive 
actions 1nay be brought for the subsequent con-
tinuance of the 'vrong or nuisance. 
"It follo\\Ts that it \Vas error to ad1nit proof 
as to the effect of the overfio,ving se,ver upon the 
1narket value of Con1er 's property, and error to 
charge the jury that they could assess the dam-
ages upon any assumption that the 'vrong of the 
eity would be perpetuated.'' 
The cases involving odors from raw sewage are 
particularly analogous to the case at bar. Conestee 1Wills 
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'V. Green,ville, 160 S.C. 10, 158 S.E. 113, 75 A.IJ.R. r)19, 
\·v·as another such case. One of the defenses presented 
vvas that the plaintiff had purchased his land after the 
installation of the sewage system. The judgment of the 
lower court dismissing the co1nplaint -vvas reversed by 
the Supreme Court, \vhich said: 
''And by the better rule, the determination 
of the question of one right or successive rights 
in turn depends chiefly upon whether the cause of 
injury is per1nanent or temporary. 
''The distinction is well n1ade in Ilarntan 1). 
R. Co., 87 Tenn 614, 11 S.W. 703, 704: 'There is 
a broad distinction between those injuries occa-
sioned by causes permanent in their character, 
and vvhich are likely to continue with no right in 
plaintiff to abate them, and those vvhich arise 
from nuisances which n1ay be discontinued. In 
respect to the forn1er, the entire da1nages, past 
and prospective, can be estin1ated, and the cause 
of action cannot be split up; \vhile as to the latter 
it is not to be presumed that the 'vrongs will be 
continued, and it would be unjust to defendant 
to allovv plaintiff to recover dan1ages estimated 
upon such an assu1nption. On the other hand, it 
'vould be equally wrong to pern1it defendant to 
insist upon such a rule of co1npensation, and thu~' 
becon1e vested 'vith a perpetual license to co1n1nit 
a nuisance, to the injury of plaintiff and over hi~ 
protest.' 
"It should be borne in mind that the cans(· 
of the injury is not necessarily· per1nanent because 
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the strueturP through \\·hich it opPrntes is of a 
per1nanent nature. Indeerl, the physical character 
of the str,1eture itself Inay have little or no bear-
ing upon the permaneney of the cause of the in-
jury, as to \Yhich the principal question, according 
tu the solnHler vie'Y and as indicated in the case 
j u~t cited, i~ \\yhether the nuisance is legally abat-
ablt•. -\\.-ithout atte1npting an exhaustive discus-
~ion of the subject, it is sufficient for the purposes 
of this case to ~ay that successive injuries caused 
by the negligent operation of an enterprise auth-
orized by la"' give rise to successive rights of 
action, on the theory that, while the enterprise 
itseli is not abatable, the negligent manner of 
operating it is illegal and abatable. That the 
nuisanee here complained of was abatable 'vill 
hardly be denied, as the record shows that, after 
the institution of this suit, the city of G-reenville 
installe<l a huge sewerage system, ineluding a dis-
posal plant for treating the sewage, thereby ef-
fecting an actual abate1nent. '' 
Oklaho;;ra C1if,t/ F .. :.11cAlllister, 174 Old. 208, 50 Pac. 
( 2cl) 361, 'vas an action brought against Oklahoma City 
for da1nages for inadequate facilities and improper treat-
lnent of se,vage causing the fouling of the waters c.rossing 
the plaintiff's lands . 
.J udgn1ent for the plaintiff was reversed on the 
ground that personal injury and the injury to the prop-
erty had not been separated and no proof adduced of 
the a1nonnt of injury. 
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The court said: 
"Where a nuisance causes a permanent in-
jury to property, the measure of damages is th~ 
depreciated value of the property; that is, the 
difference between its value before and after the 
injury. If, hovvever, as in the present case, the 
injury is not a permanent one, but only temporary 
or removable, the measure of damages is the de-
preciation in the rental or usable value of the 
property during the time of its maintenance, lin1-
ited by the statute of limitation." 
In Phillips Petroleurn ~-. Rttble (Okla.), 126 Pac. ( 2) 
526, the plaintiff brought suit for damages for an alleged 
permanent injury to his real propert~! and for dan1ages 
for personal inconvenience, annoyance and disco1nfort, 
caused by tl1e n1aintenance and operation of a po\ve.r 
plant by the defendant. 
'J~hP court said: 
''The standard suggested by the defendant as 
applied to this particular case is the depreciation 
in rental value of the property occasioned by the 
1naintenance of the nuisance. In order to 1nake 
the standard legally appropriate, the defendant 
urges that \Ve should classify the injury sustaine<l 
l)y the occupant of the property, through anno);-
ance, inconvenience and discomfort, as a property 
injury rather than a personal injury, thus depart-
ing fron1 our former vie,vs as expressed in the 
above cited cases. 
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'• "J 1 odern judicial thoughts seek to avoid fie~ 
tions. \r e cannot make a manila rope into a 
rubber nuton1obile tire by calling it such. Neither 
can w·e change an injury to the person into one 
to property hy so deno1ninating it. The fact that 
the property O\vner in this type of case is using 
his property at or during the time he receives the 
injury does not change the character or type of 
injury received. A broken arm vvould not be 
called an injury to personal property because it 
\Vas fractured in an automobile collision when the 
injured person was using his own automobile." 
In [Tnited l .. erde Extension Mining Co. v. 1-lalston_, 
81 ~\riz. 354, 296 Pac. 262, the Arizona court expressed the 
rule as follo\\TS : 
..... 
•' The O\vners being prevented by the poison.-
ous fun1es from either farming or leasing their 
lands in 1926 and 1927, were entitled to the fair 
rental or usable value thereof for these years. 
17 C. J. 883 ~ Eno 1'. Christ, 25 1\!Jisc. Rep. 24, 54 
X.'{.S. 400: Ewing ,et ux. v. City of Louisville, 
x140 Ky. 726, 131 S.vV. 1016, 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) 612; 
Ponca Refining Co. v. S1nith, 73 Okl. 6, 175 P. 268; 
Lipsconzb 1\ Sottth Bend R. C,o., 65 S.C. 148, 43 
~.E. 388; Baltintore, etc., R.R. Co. v. B,oyd, 67 Md. 
32, 10 A. 315, 1 Am. St. Rep. 362 ~ Barclay t:. 
Gr-ov-e, 9 Sadler, 153, 11 A. 888. In s.edgwick on 
IhunagPs, ~ 184 (9th Ed.) is found this language: 
''Vhere an o\vner of land is wrongfully 
prevented from occupying it, the measure of 
his dan1ages is the value of the use of the 
lanfl-that is, its rental value. So \vhere the 
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plaintiff's far1ning land \\'US \vrongfully 
overfio,ved by the defendant, the r.neasure of 
dan1ages is the use of the land, not the value 
of the crops that 1night have hcen raised. on 
•t ' 1 . 
'' ~rhe plaintiffs and their assit,rnors vvere, un-
(ler the allegations of the cornplaint, just as effec-
tively prevented by the fun1es from occupying 
and enjoying their lands as though they had been 
overfio,ved by \Vater or other,vise. ~rhe gas and 
smoke did not evict thein, it is true, hut did de-
prive the1n of the beneficial use thereof and noth-
ing further \Vas required because the n1anner in 
'vhich this use was interfered ·with, \vhether by 
fumes, 'vater or othervi.,""ise, \vas inn11aterial. '' 
In Idaho G~old Dredging Corp /r. FJ oise Payette LuJn-
ber Co., 52 Idaho 76G, 22 IJac. (2) 147, plaintiff recovered 
damages from the defendant upon the theory that th0 
measure of damages vvas the difference between the value 
of the placer mining ground, o1vned and opera ted b~v the 
plaintiff, after the \Vaters had become polluted 'vith 
grease and oil from the defendant's operation and its 
value as it \Vould have heen had such pollution not oc-
curred. The lower court granted a new trial. In grant-
ing this 1notion the court concluded that the grease and 
oil which caused the loss of gold constituted a te1npcn·ary 
nuisance and that therefore damages n1easured by the 
result in depreciation in value of the rnining ground 
could not he recovered. The court said: 
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"Th0re are a great many cases wherein the 
rule is stated to the effect that, if defendant has 
dan1aged plaintiff's property by n1eans of a tem-
pol·ary nuisance, or one vvhich can be abated, 
recoYery for ten1porary injury only can be had, 
and the difference in the value of the property 
before and after the injury is not the proper Ineas-
ure of dan1ages. This rule is based on the theory 
that abatement of the cause of injury will abate 
the injury, and it should be applied only in cases 
\Vherein this is true. After all, it is the character 
of the injury, "\vhether temporary or permanent, 
and not the character of the cause of it, which 
controls. 
"In Oklahoma City v. Page, 153 Old. 285, 
6 P. (2d) 1033, 1034, the Supre1ne Court of Okla-
homa said: 
'Although in an action for a temporary 
nuisance there can be no assessment of dan1-
ages upon the theory that the nujsance is per-
manent, because that would permit a recovery 
for what has not been done and what it can-
not be considered vvill be done, it does not 
follovv that if permanent damage has actually 
been sustained from a temporary nuisance 
and is not conditioned upon future conduct, 
recovery for it can be denied. * :r.· ~~.: 
'It is true that for a permanent nuisance 
the 1neasure of compensation is one sum for 
all damage, and the allowance is whatever 
difference in market value results from a 
consideration of all of the dan1age, but it 
does not follo"\v that a difference in market 
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value cannot be a proper measure of recovery 
for damage done by a ten1porary nuisance, 
so Jar as such a difference has actually re-
sulted, solely from what has already been 
done, and is not required to be at all condi-
tional upon a further continuance of the tor-
tious conduct. vVhile for a te1nporary nui-
sance there can only be a recovery for the 
wrong already comn1itted, that in no manner 
denies recovery for damage that has resulted 
in depreciation in value not depenclent upon 
prospective cause.' '' 
JlcG-ill v. l~i-ntsch Co1npressing Couzpany, (lo1oa), 
118 N .,V. 786, \Vas an action to enjoin defendant fron1 
n1anufacturing con1pressed gas and for darnages. 
The court said : 
"Even though there was a nuisance, it does 
not follo\v that dan1ages \vere proven. The dwell-
ing \vas occupied as a tenant, and depreciation 
in the value of the premises because of the injury, 
as it was not permanent but subject to abate1nent, 
\vas not thP n1easure of damages ... (citing cases). 
In such a case, in the absenee of injury to thP 
property itself, the 1neasure of da1nages is the 
din1inution of the rental value caused hy thP 
1naintenance of the nuisance. This depreciation 
must result from interfe·rence "\vith the coinfort-
able enjoyment of the pre1nises, and not fron1 the 
1nere prejudice against the property in conse-
quence of its proxilnity to the plant, for the latter 
depreciation cannot be said to have been caused hy 
the injury. 4 Sutherland on Darnages, § 1048: 
R~tst v. T7ictoria Graving Docl-c Co., 36 Ch. Div. 
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113, 131; Robb r. C'arnPgie B1~os. c(; Co., 145 Pa. 
:t~-t, 22 ~-\tl. ti-±9, 1-± L.R.A. 329, 27 Am. St. Rep. 
694: City of San An-tonio v. Estate of Mackey, 22 
'rex. c;iY ..... \pp. 1-±5, 5-l S.\V. 33.' 
Shively v. (~edar lfapids, I. F. & N. Ry. Q,o., (Io,va), 
37 N. \\ .... 133, \\~as an artion brought to recover damages 
caused by a nuisance created by the construction and 
operation of a stockyard and hog lot. The declaration 
charged that defendant kept almost continuously a large 
nun1ber of hogs in this lot, by reason whereof the said 
lot beea1ne foul and loathso1ne, and was a nuisance, 
en1itting foul, unsavory, and unhealthful sn1ells, so as 
to render plaintiff's house aln1ost uninhabitable, and 
aln1ost totally destroying its value, greatly inconvenienc-
ing plaintiff, and endangering the health of plaintiff and 
his fa1nily. 
The lo\ver court charged the jury as follows: 
''. . . If you find for plaintiff, then you will 
proceed to assess and determine from the evidence 
the amount of damages he is entitled to recover 
in this action; the measure of which will be the 
loss or diminution of the fair rental value of the 
property in question from the time you find such 
nuisance 'vas established up to the commence-
lnent of thi~ suit, and find for the plaintiff in such 
sum .... " 
Although the plaintiff objected that the din1inution 
or the fair rental value w·as an in1proper measure, the 
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court approved it, hPeause, like the case at bar, th0 
nuisance v.ras not necessarily a perrnanent one, saying: 
' ' rl"'he appellants insist that the paragraph 
of the charge quoted did not properly instruct the 
jury as to the 1neasure of the plaintiff's dan1ages. 
'l"'he alleged nuisance is not necessarily a per-
Inanent one, hut rnay be abated at any time by 
the defendants. Plaintiff vvould not have be0.n 
entitled to recover the full value of his propert~· 
even though he had shovvn that it 'vas valu~~less 
'vhile the nuisance existed, because it n1ight pro"'":·e 
to he but temporary, hence the depreciation in 
rental value under the facts in this case 'Yas the 
proper n1easure of plaintiff's recover~v·. '' 
Other cases out of the many which hold that the 
n1easure of da1nages used by the lo,ver court and ap-
proved in this Court's opinion is in1proper, have already 
been quoted in appellant's n1ain brief, and we merely 
refer to then1 here : 
T7 ogt v. City of Grinnel, 98 N.W. 782, (quoted in 
main brief on page 105) : 
Bartless v. Gresselle Che1nioal CD., 92 \\7• , ... a. 445, 
115 S.E. 451, 27 A.L.R. 54 (quoted on page 
106 of the main brief) ; 
Theisen v. Pitwin ~s (e Dean Co., 162 N.\\i. 7G 
(quoted on page 111 of the brief) ; 
.Ehlert r. Galveston H. & S. A. Railroad Conzpany_, 
27 4 S.W. 172 (quoted on page III of brief) : 
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Cross r. Te.ras Jfilitary Colleg-e, 65 S.W. (2d) 794 
(quoted on page 114 of brief) ; 
Oates v .. AJgedon lJ!fg. Co., 217 N. C. 488, 8 S. E. 
(2d) 605 (quoted on page 116 of brief); 
City of A-4da r. Ill elberg, 160 N.W. 257 ( quoted on 
page 117 of brief) ; 
City of San Antonio v. Mackey's Estate, 54 S.W. 
33 (quoted on page 119 of the brief). 
In contrast to this general rule of law, this Court, 
unless it grants a rehearing, will go on record as approv-
ing the follo\ving doctrine expressed in its opinion in 
the principal case : 
''The findings and conclusions of the court 
indicate that in assessing damages the trial judge 
used the proper criterion-the difference in mar-
ket value of each tract with its improvements 
\vithout the stench nuisance existing, as compared 
\vith the value as affected by such odors.'' 
\Ve submit that it is inequitable for this Court to 
lay down at this late date a standard like the above for 
ascertaining temporary damages. It opens the way for 
unjust enrich1nent .of the plaintiffs. It violates principles 
of fairness and ignores entirely the possibility of any 
improvement or abatement made by the defendant, of 
voluntary discontinuance of business, or of an injunc-
tion action successfully brought by other neighbors. 
Already in the record (Trans. 891, 1035 ; Abs. 241, 
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258) there is testin1ony of iruproven1ents in the fire box 
and in the 1nanner of controlling the gases. \Vho can 
say that further adjushnents or the addition of a ne'v 
jnvention 1nay not in this year or next eli1ninate the 
odors entirely~ The n1easure of damages adopted by 
this. Court not only discourages the elirnination of the 
nuisances by n1aking the defendant pay as for a pernla-
nRnt nuisance but it re,vards the plaintiffs for a per-
Inanent injury which they have not suffered and n1ay 
never suffer. 
II. 
This Court has ignored the doct·rine of' Da,hl v. Utab 
Oil Refinin.r; Oo1npany. 
On the question of the operation of plants en1ittinr~: 
odors in industrial areas the princi])al case holds directly 
contrary to the case of Dahl v. Utah Oil Ilefining C1ont-
pany, 71 Utah 1, 262 Pacific 269. 
In the principal case the court said: 
''The mere fact thn t an area is not incor-
porated in a city or town with zoning regulations, 
does not 'varrant establish1nent of eommereial 
institutions "\Vhich emit the described stenches in 
such region where life thereby will be rendrr~d 
unpleasant to the residents thereof. Nor does the 
fact that an industry n1ay serve a useful purposP 
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t)r produce colninercial commodities \Varrant its 
location at a place vvhich merely suits the con-
venience of the ovvner or operator, in \ltter dis-
regard for the effect it has on the value· or enjoy-
ment of other properties. 
''. . . \Y-hen an industry is of such a char-
acter that it produces foul odors, those who are 
responsible for its operation have the duty to 
place it "There it vvill not result in injury to the 
property of others. The mere fact that there 
1nay already exist in the area a condition which 
1nay be obnoxious to some persons, does not 
create a license for establishment of· other more 
offensive conditions.'' 
In the Dahl case the contrary la\V \Vas established; 
the court sa·ying: 
''The right to recover damages for injuries 
occasioned by fumes, gases, dust, smoke, foul air, 
etc., being cast upon one's property by another, 
in proper cases, is well established. But the rule 
of liability is not absolute and the law does not 
afford Tedress for every such discomfort or annoy-
ance. Extreme rights in this regard cannot be 
enforced. Of necessity- some degree of incon-
venience and annoyance must be endured or com-
lnunity and social life would be impossible. It 
thus follows that what constitutes in law an ac-
tionable nuisance is al\vays a question of degree. 
The cases cited and relied on by the plaintiff are 
instances vvhere, under all the circumstances, the 
use of the property con1plained of was held un-
reasonable. I-Iere, \vhere the facts and circum-
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stances, hoth \vith respect to the origin antl nature 
of the thing contplained of and the degree of its 
offense, differ essentially fron1 those of the cases 
cited, \ve have an entirely different legal question. 
While a nuisance, in the orclinary sense in 
\vhich the vvord is used, is anything that pro<luces 
an annoyance--anything that disturbs one or is 
offensive-in legal phraseology it is applied to 
that class of \Vrongs that arise fron1 the unreason-
able, unvvarrantahle, or unla,vfu] use by a person 
of his property. f~very person has the right to 
tl1e reasonable enjoy1nent of his property. As to 
\vhat is a reasonable use of one's property rnust 
necessarily depend upon the circun1stances of each 
case, for a use for a particular purpose an(l in n 
particular \vay, in one localit~~, that \vould hcJ. 
la\vful and reasonable rnight he unla,vful and a 
nuisance in another. 1 vVood on Nuisances (3r<1 
Ed.) §§ 1, 2. The test of vvhether the use of the 
property constitutes a nuisance is the reasonable-
ness of the use con1plained of in the particular 
locality and in the 1nanner and under the circun1-
stances of the case. 29 Cyc. 1156. A business 
\vhich might be perfectly proper in a business or 
n1anufacturing neighborhood 1nay he a nuisance 
"\vhen carried on in a residential distrjct; and, con-
versely, a business which 'vith its incidents 1night 
he considered a nuisance in a residential distric-t 
1nay be proof against Ct)lnplaint where conducted 
in a business of n1anufacturing locality, although 
an extraordinary use of property introducing a 
serious annoyance which directly and suhstall--
tially damages the property of another or cau~e~ 
unnecessary annoyance to persons in the vicinit~· 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1~ not justified by the fact that the place is a 
lllanufactnring locality. :2D C~Te. 11~7, 1158." 
The follo\ving further quotation fro1n the Dahl case 
applies to the rase at bar: 
"There is no claim that the defendant,. by 
any careless or extraordinary or unnecessary use 
of its property, produces the injury complained of. 
The sole ground of con1plaint is that offensive and 
disagreeable fumes or odors emanate from the 
refinery and are carried through the air to the 
plaintiff's house. It is admitted that the odors 
are not constant and are not injurious to life or 
health, and it is obvious that they cause no direct 
or physical injury to property. The extent of 
the offense claimed is that the odors are disagree-
able and unpleasant and have at times vvakened 
persons sleeping in plaintiff's house and required 
then1 to shut doors and windows. In these cir-
ctnnstances vve are unable to say as a matter of 
ls'v that a case of unreasonable use or actionable 
nuisance was made out.'' 
One error of this Court in the case at bar consisted 
n1ainly in its failure to recognize that the defendant's 
plant is established in the neighborhood and surround-
ings most appropriate for its establishment. If we recog-
nize the law' to be that the whole question of nuisance is 
one of reasonableness, as the Dahl case sets forth, then 
're should look again at the surroundings and ask our-
selves whether the plant could have been established in 
any place more suitable than the one chosen. It is built 
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( 1) upon a plot of ground where a brick 1nanufacturing 
plant had been operated for many years; (2) it 'va~ 
built on the railroad and particularly on the spur of that 
railroad not far from a second railroad, and (3) near a 
sugar factory, pea vinery, flour mill, alfalfa mill, cattle 
feed yards, stock loading yard, beet storage and loading 
chutes, and vvoolloading platforms. 
This Court has found on its opinion-we submit 
\vrongly-that the area in '\Thich the plant is established 
is not industrial, and in so doing it has failed to recognize 
the essential element behind the doctrine of the Dahl case 
and the. la\v of nuisance, to-wit: "that an establish1nent 
is not a nuisance \Vhen it is reasonably constructed and 
operated in an area to 'vhich it is adapted." 
This Court points out that the sugar factory, pea 
viriery, n1ills, feed yards and loading y·ards are essential 
to the marketing of the agricultural products and live 
stock. So we submit: given the defendant's plant, which 
ren1oves the dead carcasses fro1n the neighborhood, pro-
vides an outlet for waste n1atter and furnishes feed and 
fertilizer to the farmers-vvhere could a 1nore appropri-
ate place for its operations be found than on an old 
brick-yard near the railroad, in the outskirts of the coin-
munity furnishing the material for its existence~ While 
we believe the court erred vvhen it said that the plant 
is not in an industrial area, the point we vvish to n1ake 
is this: that the reasonableness of the location and opera-
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tion of this plant does not depend upon 'vhether the area 
i~ industrial or not. ...~s this Court said : 
''The test of 'vhether the use of the property 
constitutes a nuisance is the reasonableness of the 
use con1plained of in the particular locality and 
in the 1nanner and under the circumstances of the 
case.·' D·ahl 'l'. Ut.ah Oil Refining Company, 
supra. 
This Court in its opinion in the case at bar has failed 
to note that the distinction is not the simple difference 
between an industrial area and a residential area. There 
i~~ an infinite ntnnber of gradations between the two. To 
find that the area is not industrial does not necessarily 
1nean that it is residential. The opinion disregards the 
cattle, sheep and hogs, the barnyards 'vith their filth, 
the pea viner, the sugar factory, and the stock loading 
chutes on the railroad, together with the fact that the 
defendant's plant is on an old brick yard on the outskirts 
of a sparsely settled community, and treats the area in 
the same manner that it \-Vould treat the most rigidly 
zoned, thickly populated, strictly residential area in a 
city. The absence of zoning restrictions does not warrant 
the establishment of such institutions, says the opinion. 
Neither, \-Ve subn1it, should the presence of a fe,v homes 
in a sparcely settled farming community prevent the 
gro,vth of industry already well established along a 
railroad. 
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The very w·ording of the opinion requires further 
clarification in the light of the various t~ypes of areas 
which might be found appropriate for the establish1nent 
of an industry: 
"The fact that a region actually 1nay be in-
dustrial does not justify the creation with impun-
ity of odors or stenches to an exoessive degree 
\vhich unreasonably annoy others in the legitimate 
use of their properties or in their occupation, 
especially \vhen such conditions depreciate the 
value of other properties in such area.'' (I talirs 
ours.) 
What is an excesstve degree~ ''rhen do odors or 
stenc.hes unreasonably annoy others~ Unless son1e stan-
dard is set, \Ve are subject to individual caprices and 
opinion of the presiding judge, 111ore elastic than the 
length of the chancellor's foot so often criticized. No 
standard is set in this case. No finding is made by either 
court of any unreasonable operation by the defendant, or 
even that its location is unreasonable. 
The Dahl case has set a standard. And we suh1nit 
that when that standard is applied, it necessarily follo\vs 
that the Colorado Animal plant is located and is operated 
in an area to \vhich it is reasonably adapted. 
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III. 
The Court erred in assunring ,in, its opin£on that the 
dtfend ant u·a ired a jury trial. 
The defendant "·antrd n jury trial and contended 
thnt it had a right to a jury trial for each of the separate 
claiins of the eleYen individual plaintiffs against the 
defendant. It has long been recognized that the jury 
system is especially adapted to a decision on specific and 
silnple issues, and common la-\v pleading and procedure 
are directed to,vard the framing of definite issues which 
the jury or layn1en can grasp and decide. It is equally 
recognized that a n1ultiplicity of issues coupled with a 
rnultiplicity of parties is a burden far too heavy to place 
on a jury of layn1en for its decision. The defendant, "\Ve 
repeat, cle1nanded a separation of the causes of action 
so that each of the sirnple issues could be tried before 
r. jury on its own merits. So long as the issues remained 
conglomerate-so long as they involved the finding of 
damage for eleven different plaintiffs residing in eleven 
different directions from the plant at eleven distances 
'vho 'vere being affected by \vinds blowing in different 
directions at different ti1nes, some of whom had 'vorked 
at the plant and contributed to the nuisance, while others 
ha(l not, and so1ne of 'vho1n increased the value of their 
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property after the plant had begun operation-as long as 
all of these plaintiffs \Vere united in one action, of course, 
the defendant could not properly demand a jury. Surely 
it is unfair to the defendant to claim that it waived a 
jury under such circu1nstances. 
The opinion of the court, however, says that not only 
did the defendant fail to demand a jury trial but the 
minutes sho\v that on October 2, 1939, when plaintiffs 
demanded a jury for deter1nination of the question of 
dan1ages the defendant resisted such demand. The de-
fendant opposed a jury at this time for the sa1ne reason 
that it did not demand a jury trial. The lower court had 
overruled both defendant's demurrer to the original 
complaint and its demurrer to the supplen1ental conl-
plaint on the grounds of misjoinder of causes of action 
and misjoinder of parties. The defendant then was in 
a position where if it did not resist its demand for jury 
it "\vould have all the issues and all of the various situa-
tions of the plaintiffs jumbled together and placed before 
a jur~ of laymen. We submit that to resist such a de-
mand is in no way equivalent to resisting or \vaiving a 
jury to try separately each of the twelve different issues 
in this case. 
This incident of the demand for jury trial is a silnple 
illustration of the fallacy of the claim that when there is 
such a joinder of parties and issues the legal rights of 
the defendants are retained. 
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In it~ op1n1on herein this (iourt said: "If the de-
fendant had not \YaiYed a jury trial, it \Vould have been 
proper to have had damages determined by a jury,'' 
citing Wasatch Oil Refining Co. r. Wade, 92 Utah 50, 
63 P. (2nd) 1070. But Wasatch Oil Refining Co. v. Wade 
held: 
"\\~here, however, the case is one of equity 
jurisdiction and the question of damages is before 
the court, to be granted if proved, either in sub-
stitution for or in addition to equitable relief, the 
denial of a jury trial is not the denial of any legal 
right.'' 
Does this mean, then, that the Kinsman case is to be 
1nodified to the extent that one party demanding a jury 
in an equity case involving a multiplicity of parties and 
issues may have that jury as a matter of right, and that 
the other party will be subjected to a verdict of laymen 
on this diversity of issues, \vithout right of protest~ Or 
does it mean, on the other hand, that there is no right to 
a jury at all, and all these issues must be found by the 
trial judge, sitting as an equity court~ Mr. Justice 
Frick, concurring in the Kinsman case (Kinsman v. Ut~ah 
Gas & Coke Co., 53 Utah 10, 177 Pac. 418), said that the 
joined parties would have a right to separate appeals: 
''In actions where the rights of the parties 
are separate, but where they join in one action 
to avoid a multiplicity of suits, or for some other 
good reason, each one may prosecute an appeal 
independently.'' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
34 
Is not this the tin1(~ to clarify the 'vhole confusion 
raised by the varied interpretations of the J(insJnan cast~ 
and state the la"r to be what it should be, to-\vit, that 
'vhen there is a legal question of damages involved, the 
defendant should have a right to a separation of the 
parties and issues for the henefit of a jury trial"? 
CONCT_JUSION 
For these three principal reasons, therefore, "~e re-
quest a rehearing of this case. Other n1a tters, such a~ 
the manner of justifying the lower court's excessive conl-
putation of damage, could be urged. We feel, ho,vever, 
that the matter of this Court's approving a 1neasure of 
damages that can be applicable only in the event of a 
permanent damage, is so serious that it alone 'varrant~ 
a rehearing of thi~ matter, and includes the errors of 
computation. 
The second ground of the petition is the fart that 
the Court overlooked entirely the basis of the Dahl 
case-that the use of the plant n1ust be unreasonable in 
its location to be a nuisance. This, we submit, warrant~ 
a rehearing. 
The third basis is the accusation of the Court that 
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lower court's refusal to separate the causes of action, and 
of this Court's statement to the law of joinder, the de-
fendant never had the privilege or the right to waive a 
jury trial of a straight-forward issue between it and any 
one of its plaintiffs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~IOYLE RICHARDS & McKAY, 
Attorneys for D~efendJant and Appellant. 
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